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BOOK REVIEWS
THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SOVIET
TREATIES. By Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. 593. $10.00.
This book is an important contribution to our knowledge
of Soviet international law, and should be of great interest
to all who are concerned to understand the role of law in
international ralations. It also sheds light on many aspects
of Soviet history and political theory. It is the first major
work on Soviet international law to be published in the United
States since Taracouzio's book of 1935.1
The basis of the study is provided by the 2,516 international agreements which the Soviet Union has entered into
between 1917 and 1957. 2 (The authors do not carry their
analysis beyond 1957, although they use secondary sources
of more recent vintage.) It is interesting to note that of all
international agreements involving the Soviet Union (including multilateral as well as bilateral) in the period under
investigation, her most frequent treaty partner was the
United States (373 agreements). Also, it is worth noting that
some 850, or about one-third of the total number of Soviet
treaties, concerned economic matters (chiefly commerce).
Almost 600 were principally political treaties (including
treaties concerned with diplomatic relations), and the rest
were "functional or technical" treaties concerning legal
issues, communications, transportation, cultural questions,
repatriation of citizens, health problems, and other matters.
The authors divide their work into two principal parts,
one devoted to the Soviet law of treaties and the other to
Soviet treaty policy. In addition, there is an introductory
chapter on "Treaties as a Principal Source of Order in
Relations Among Nations," in which Soviet theories of international law and of treaty law are explored, and a concluding
1. T. A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1935). It is unfortunate that the authors do not cite the Taracouzio work, as it would have been interesting to have their evaluation
of it.
2.
These are identified, listed and indexed in J. F. TRISKA AND R.
M. SLUSSER, A CALENDAR OF SOVIET TREATIES, 1917-1957 (1959).
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section which discusses problems of peaceful solution of
treaty disputes, treaty violations, and advantages and disadvantages of entering into various kinds of treaties with
the Soviet Union.
In the introductory chapter, the evolution of Soviet theory
is traced from its original position that international treaties
are virtually the sole source of international law, to the
present position that international treaties are a principal
source of international law, but that international custom is
also a principal source and that general principles (concepts
and norms) of international law, decisions of international
organizations (including international courts) as well as
national law (judicial decisions, domestic legislation, etc.)
are subsidiary sources of international law. "We may conclude," the authors state (p. 31), "that after forty years of
'struggle,' 'coexistence,' and 'competition,' there is a fairly
close similarity between Soviet and Western views on the
sources of order in international relations, and that in both
international treaties are of principal importance.11 As the
authors put it, "given the essential and intrinsic qualities of
international treaties -- namely, their flexible, rational,
specific, innovating, adaptable, and decentralized character -" it is not surprising that the Soviets should attach great
importance to them.
The chapters on "The Soviet Law of Treaties" trace
in detail the evolution of the Soviet concept of international
treaties with regard to their formulation, conclusion, performance, and termination. The authors conclude that although Soviet treaty law "renders the Soviet Union a difficult
contracting partner," in most respects it is not very different
from Western treaty law (p. 172). "They both shared one
But where
cradle, and this common origin still shows."
Soviet treaty law does differ from Western concepts, "the
difference is profound."
The chief difference lies in the treatment of problems
relating to unilateral termination of treaties. Here Soviet
doctrine, in the most general sense of that term, is similar
to that of other countries. Thus Soviet and non-Soviet jurists
agree that it is lawful for a contracting party unilaterally
to terminate an international treaty if the other contracting
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party has violated it. Also, with respect to the effect of
changed conditions and the validity of unequal treaties Soviet
theory as orthodox in recognizing the necessity "to steer a
course between the Scylla of impairing the obligations of good
faith and the Charybdis of enforcing obsolete and oppressive
treaties." The profound difference, the authors state, "is in
motivation and application." (p. 141)
Soviet jurists are
"guilty of not admitting the gravest violations by the Soviet
government of treaty obligations voluntarily accepted, in
reckless abandonment of all principles which happen to be
in conflict either with Soviet security or with its drive for
expansion or with both. But then, we must be charitable:
if the doctrine attempted to deal frankly with Soviet treaty
violations, there probably would be no Soviet doctrine to
discuss."
The authors' charity, in this respect, is based in part
on their recognition that Soviet writers on international law
are far more strictly limited by the treaty practice of their
government than their counterparts in the West. The Soviet
jurist is not free to propound a doctrine of international law
which would be adverse to his government's interests as
conceived by his government. He writes, in effect, as a
lawyer for his government. Just as it is difficult to imagine
the Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State
(at least while he is in office) writing an article charging
the United States with violating international law, so one
cannot imagine a Soviet law professor ever admitting-unless
and until his government has admitted it-a Soviet violation.
Thus to a certain extent every Soviet book or article on
international law must be viewed as an apology or a brief.
By the same token, however, the orthodoxy of Soviet
jurists in accepting the general rules of treaty law is an
encouraging sign. Here the authors perhaps err on the side
of underestimating the role of law in shaping Soviet policy.
They rightly condemn Soviet legal theory for its political
orientation, its "hostile, purposeful ideology," which leads to
the distortion of doctrine in the interests of the Soviet state
and of the spread of Communism. Yet the theoretical acceptance of general principles of international law-after
an initial rejection of them on Marxist grounds-is a signal
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victory of the jurists, who were apparently able to persuade
their political superiors that the Soviet state has more to
gain than to lose from a theoretical acceptance of those
principles. And in fact the whole world (and not merely
the Soviet Union) would be in a far worse situation if the
Soviets denied that "socialist" and "capitalist" countries
could enter into binding agreements which create law for
both sides.
In emphasizing the Soviet view that Soviet doctrines of
international law are, in theory as well as practice, an
instrument of Soviet national policy, the authors overlook the
striking statements of G. I. Tunkin, Chief of the Treaty and
Legal Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
that international law, though an instrument of policy, cannot
be an instrument of any policy but only of such policy as is
compatible with international law, so that not only does
national policy influence international law, but also international law influences national policy. 3 Nor do the authors
make enough, it seems to this reviewer, of the Soviet acceptance of a general body of international law which, theoretically at least, binds all states. This acceptance weakens
the authors' statement that "In the Soviet view there is no
such thing as a world community." (p. 381).
. The non-specialist will perhaps be more attracted to the
part of the book on treaty policy than to that on treaty law.
Here, however, the authors have undertaken an impossible
task-namely, to present in a few hundred pages an analysis
of the content of the various types of treaties into which the
Soviet Union has entered.
There are many interesting
episodes of Soviet international relations which are recounted
in these chapters, but they are inevitably sketchy in many
cases.
3.
"Peaceful Coexistence and International Law," Sovetaskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo, 1956, No. 7, p. 3. Tunkin states: "International law, together

with the fact

that it

represents a combination

binding upon states, is,
and capitalist states in

of principles and norms

like any law, a weapon of policy: both socialist
carrying out their foreign policy make more or

less use of international law. From this, however,

it

certainly does not

follow that international law can be a weapon of any policy. Generally
recognized principles and norms of contemporary international law, being in their essence democratic, may be used as a weapon of the foreign

policy of states only within the limits defined

by the content of those

norms." (pp. 10-11). At Page 176 the authors cite a strong statement of
another Soviet jurist
(Korovin) to the opposite effect without indicating
that it reflects a position long-since repudiated.
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Particularly disappointing, in the reviewer's opinion, is

the authors' treatment of Soviet economic treaties, which
they rightly characterize as the most stable type of Soviet
treaty. The discussion of the most-favored-nation clause in
Soviet commercial treaties, for example, is marred by the
acceptance of the Hazard-Domke thesis that the clause serves
no useful purpose in dealing with the Soviets since they may
discriminate simply by not purchasing or selling in praticular markets. This thesis ignores the variety of functions of
a most-favored-nation clause and minimizes the possibilities
of gaining concessions from the Soviets in return for it; the
argument has been rejected not only by Soviet jurists, as
the authors state, but also by many Western jurists as well.'
Similarly, the authors accept too easily the view that
the decision of the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in the Israeli oil case of 1957 was without legal

justification. 5 They also exaggerate in saying that Soviet
foreign trade is "valued as much, if not more, for purposes
of political strategy as for puposes of economic policy"-

(pp. 356-57)-a statement which is surprising in view of the
fact that Soviet exports and imports amount to some ten
billion dollars a year; indeed, if the statement is true, it
casts doubt on the authors' conclusion that "Certain types of
4.
The Hazard-Domke thesis was presented in a paper circulated in
advance of a conference of Eastern and Western jurists held in Rome in
1958 under the auspices of the International Association of Legal Science.
The paper presented at the conference, together with an introduction by
the reviewer summing up the results of the discussions, may be found
in International Association of Legal Science, Aspeets Juridiques -do Commerce avee les Pays d'Eeonomle planiflee. All those at the conference
(except Professor Hazard) expressed themselves as opposed to the thesis.
including not only the reviewer but also Professors Andre Tunc and Lazare Kopelmanas of France, whom the authors of the work under review
wrongly designate as compatriots of Professor Genkin of the U.S.S.R.
Reasons why the most-favored-nation clause serves a useful, though limited, function in treaties with countries of planned economy are stated in
Berman, The Legal Framework of Trnde Between Planned and Market
24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 482,
Economies: The Soviet-American Example,
525 (1959), which the authors apparently overlooked. In connection with
their discussion of the most-favored-nation clause, the authors refer indirectly to but do not discuss what is perhaps the most interesting innovation of the Soviets in international treaties, namely, the bilateral (and
on occasions plunlateral) agreement for programmed exchanges of goods
over a period of years.
5.
The award is reproduced in the notes, pages 506-510, together with
the evaluation of Professor Domke. Whether the risk of denial of an export license is on the exporter or the importer, absent a special reference
to the question in the contract and given a broad force majeure clause, has
been decided variously in various countries. The Soviet decision in this
respect-although
in
the reviewer's opinion erroneous-does not depart
from the practice of many countries, including the United States. See
Berman, Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export License under Soviet
Law: A Comment on Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1128 (1960).
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economic agreements with the Soviet Union may be regarded
as reasonably safe bets." (p. 400).
In their final chapter the authors raise the question, "Is
it not legitimate to hope that (the basic principles of international law to which the Soviet jurists adhere) will some
day, if not now, constitute a wholesome influence on Soviet
treaty practice and gradually lead the Soviet Union to adopt
a policy of live and let live in a world of peace and justice?"
(p. 397). Their answer is, No. By the form of the question
the authors might appear to be saying that there can be no
"wholesome influence" short of bringing about the abondonment of the revolutionary goals of world Communism. In
almost the same breath, however, they stress that "the
pressure of world opinion (is) a far from negligible factor
in the calculations of Soviet policy makers," and that treaties
with the Soviet Union "can help to create conditions in which
trust and cooperation can flourish . . . and can strengthen
the tradition of international collaboration." (p. 399). Indeed,
their last six pages are a careful summary analysis of the
kinds of treaties with the Soviet Union which can reduce
tensions in the world and thereby strengthen the prospects
for peace, and the kinds of safeguards which can make those
treaties effective.
Taking the book as a whole, then, the authors have
presented considerable evidence for the proposition that
despite the fact that the Soviet government uses international
law-sometimes quite unconscionably-to further its revolutionary aims, nevertheless the international law that it uses
for that purpose is itself a limiting factor which can and
does exercise a wholesome influence on Soviet treaty practice.
HAROLD

J.

BERMAN*

Mass.
Author,
(1950),
DOCUMENTS
SOVIET
*
ProfessorJUSTICE
of Law, IN
LawRUSSIA
School of
Harvard
University, ON
Cambridge.
MILITARY LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (With Miroslov Kerner) (1955),
and other books and numerous articles.
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COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. By Mark S. Massel. Washington, D. C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1962. Pp. xiii, 477. $6.75.
Since the rise of American legal realism in this century,
the pulse of the law has quickened perceptibly whenever
the work of the social sciences is comtemplated. The spectacular strides of science and technology have made the
legal establishment somewhat sheepish about the crudeness
of some of its analytical tools and the awful uncertainty of
its judgments. Who knows if a legal rule actually achieves
the purpose which is its justification? Do present policies
truly maximize human satisfactions? In the shadow of such
discontent, empirical studies in all manner of human relationships are discussed, planned, and projected with the triumphant goal of providing the law with the facts and guidance
On that
necessary for informed and scientific decisions.
golden day when all the Foundation-sponsored research is
in, traffic will flow in coherent patterns, criminals will be
rehabilitated, administrative agencies will be run efficiently,
and every marriage will be built on a complete orgasm, at
whatever intervals are found to be proper.
No hope of harmonizing the law and life is more insistent
than the one discussed in this excellent book. Somewhat
deceptively titled, Competition and Monopoly undertakes to
state the need and prospects for interrelating law and economics in the formulation and administration of antitrust
policies in the society. In effect, the problem which the
how and by what
book confronts is one of methodology:
agency are decisions affecting the competitive tone of the
society best rendered? The argument of its pages is that
economists can and must make a significantly greater contribution to the resolution of antitrust questions than they
have yet been permitted to do.
Writing both as economist and lawyer, Mark S. Massel
displays a sophisticated appreciation of the network of problems which cobweb the relationship between the two disciplines. He does not completely share the naivete' sometimes
attributed to the economist, that the summum bonum of
society is the most efficient use of physical resources, nor
yet does he indulge the arrogance (said to be the lawyer's)
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that a few hours research in the congressional history salted
with a reasoned argument on a statute's words will serve
the needs of the nation's economy. The author laments the
mutual contempt with which the two disciplines frequently
regard each other. He calls for each side to relent and accept
the contributions which the other can make, since the problems they face will yield only to combined effort.
In the earlier sections of his book, Mr. Massel admirably
details the puzzlement which the modern American economy
presents by the complexity, contradiction and formlessness
of its policies regarding economic competition. This ambivalence is exampled both on the policy-making level and
through the administration of existing rules in litigation.
One of the cherished symbols of our national life is a
theoretic dedication to the free enterprise system and a
policy of competition, yet numerous exceptions have been
deliberately made to this system in the labor and agricultural markets, the service industries (where state licensing
for safety and health is common), the military and space
fields, to mention merely a few obvious examples. Mr.
Massel points out that not only are there a variety of basic
public goals in direct conflict with competitive standards,
but big government inevitably shapes in errant ways the
competitive milieu by its monetary policies, its tax structure, purchasing, research, development, etc. The author
painstakingly sets down in a comprehensive fashion the innumerable barriers to full competition which exist on both
federal and state levels.
A further aspect of the competitive melange is the administration and formulation of antitrust rules within the
broader guidelines provided by policy. Typically, this job is
performed in our society by the traditional adversary system,
where the courts and quasi-judicial agencies address themselves to the case-by-case articulation of the law. Mr. Massel
exposes rather lucidly the more common deficiencies of such
a procedure for deciding economic matters:
the lack of
design in framing issues to take into account relevant
economic factors; the dependence upon a judge too frequently
untrained in economics; the remedial inadequacies imposed
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by judicial inability or reluctance to get at the roots
anticompetitive situations.

of

The foregoing attempt to describe generally what Mr.
Massel has done by way of exposition in his book is grossly
unfair to the quality and detail of his efforts. While many
commentators in this field have pointed out in a broad way
the conflict in public policies concerning competition, Mr.
Massell does the job methodically, searchingly, and with a
thoroughness that sometimes tests the reader's patience.
Similarly, while nearly everyone is quick with the cliche
that law depends upon economics, the author is not content
until he has blueprinted the innumerable points at which
the decision-making process proves the truth of the remark.
On this basis alone, the book is a valuable analysis of the
specific trouble spots in the established system. Without
any doubt, Mr. Massel knows the questions that have to be
asked in this area, and he does a superlative job of explaining
why these questions are crucial.
The physic which the author recommends is not quite
so clear or well-founded. In a chapter of summary and
recommendations, Mr. Massel stresses the two themes of
clarifying public policies regarding competition, and improving the use of economic analysis. Since these objectives are
merely pious wishes unless accompanied by some indication
of what form their achievement is to take, it is necessary
to take a critical look at what the author has in mind.
Despite the enormous knowledgeability of Mr. Massel,
evident on every page, there is a certain innocence about
his distress over the incongruities and conflicts of existing
policies on competition. To be sure, he explicitly acknowledges the relevance and inevitability of non-economic factors
in the development of a political consensus on these matters.
He clearly realizes that the farm problem is more than an
exercise in economic theory, for instance. But even after
making these qualifications, the author still seems to be
opting for some master agency which might reconcile and
interrelate the almost infinite number of public issues, state
and federal, bearing upon competition. If there really is
an indulgence in the presumption that a logical policy organized around strict competition is feasible, it may be
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partially explained by the fact that Mr. Massel has
only had to list the deviations from competitive policy, and
not seriously examine the social validity of their justification.
Perhaps many of these exceptions from the rule of competition more closely reflect what the American public desires
than does the not-so-ancient dream of Adam Smith. In justice to Mr. Massel, it should be said that he too recognizes
this possibility. My comment is only directed to the impression that the author is not at all sure of what such a continuing
reappraisal of public policies could or should accomplish.
The second theme mentioned-the improvement of economic analysis-is apparently the raison d'etre of the book.
In this respect, Mr. Massel is clearly a man of his times,
for the Holy Grail among serious commentators on antitrust
Clearly great
policy is the integral economic approach.
things are expected in this regard. As with most of the
social sciences, however, the benefits promised by economics
are temporarily obscured by the need for preliminary research, which in turn calls for the expenditure of rather significant sums of money. Mr. Massel, to his great credit, is brutally frank about the paucity of reliable economic studies upon
which to base policy judgments in particular matters. He
proposes that a series of basic studies be undertaken on
such elementary questions as, e. g., the forms of price and
non-price competition, the criteria to determine the existent..of competition. Indeed these studies are so basic that the
statement of their need is a rather effective bridle on inordinate expectations of the role economics will play in the
One could hardly disagree with Mr.
immediate future.
Massel's instinct that better economic analysis will promote
a more realistic legal regulation. But once again the book
perhaps romanticizes the prospects for important contributions from economic study. This may be another of those
areas in which the glorious promises of empirical research
are found to culminate in an interminable disagreement
about the conditions under which the research shall proceed,
Not
and the conclusions which it is competent to make.
the least realism which one has a right to expect from the
social sciences is a sense of proportion.
One of the more interesting recommendations

of the
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author envisions the creation of a central agency, similar
to the Council of Economic Advisers, to carry on a continuing
review of the operations and influences of the antitrust laws.
To some extent this would be a trouble-shooting agency,
having no power other than what it could generate by the
cogency and persuasion of its reports. It would cover such
areas as the relationships between administrative agencies,
consequences of projected governmental action, review of
judicial decrees. Some private organization may presently
serve this function, but the notion of an official agency pursuing such controversial matters on a continuing basis is
an intriguing one.
The caveats of this review should not be taken too
seriously. In a way, they pay a great compliment, for only
a serious and important work merits close attention. This
is such a work.
JOHN

E.

DUNSFORD*

COMMON MARKET LAW: TEXT AND COMMENTARIES. By Alan Campbell and Dennis Thompson. South
Hackensack, N. J.: Fred B. Rothman & Company (London:
Stevens & Sons) 1962. Pp. xxi, 487. $11.50.
Here is a recent English "import" that will prove to be
a land-mark publication, not only for the busy practitioner
who must immediately begin to deal with the legal system of
the "Six", but also the law student confronted with problems
involving the supranational law of the three common markets.
While the publication makes no pretense of constituting a
scholarly presentation, it does provide a valuable starting
point for an extended undertaking of either an academic or
practical nature.
Lord Denning in his Forward sets forth the basic problem
facing Great Britain-and in the opinion of the reviewer,
the United States-in that if any of us should associate or
join outright the Common Market "we will have to adjust
our sights" and modify our internal legal systems to a
*

Associate Professor of Law, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.
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significent degree,1 particularly in the field of anti-trust
legislation and corporate law. 2 The implications of the
Common Market on the rest of the world are especially
well recognized by the authors in that the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Ireland have already applied for membership,
whereas Turkey, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland have
applied for association. In March, 1961, Greece signed an
agreement of associ ation which will lead to full membership.
Campbell and Dennis feel, moreover, that the Commonwealth
countries in Africa and the Caribbean, and also some Asian
nations, will affiliate with the rising Common Market in
various capacities. Further, the authors treat the Common
Market treaty in relation to the spread of regionalism
3
throughout the world.
The major portion of the book is in reality a discussion
of the principal areas covered by the Rome Treaty; therefore, such topics-in addition to those indicated above-as
The General Principles of Unification; The Policy of the
Community; The Institutional Structure of the Community;
The Court of Justice; and The Problem of Establishment
are treated in detail. As such, these topics are examined
against the broader historical perspective. 4 As these chapter headings suggest, the organization of Common Market
Law is topical rather than constituting an article by article
discussion. This approach is to be preferred, especially in
view of the fact that a very complete index quickly directs
the reader to the appropriate numbered paragraph or page
number.
The work essentially follows a hornbook style in that
it is divided into relatively short numbered paragraphs
1.

See especially chapters VI and VII at 101-158; also chapters IX and X

at 165-205.
2.
"[A] legal commentary is stern stuff. It may well be that membership of the Common Market might call for changes in our Municipal
Law, and in this context it is observed not only that a special chapter of
the Treaty has been devoted to approximation of laws but also that the
Court of Justice has already given two decisions which conflict with
English legal concepts.
"Law is a reflection of public sentiment, and although at times
this image is blurred this essential truth
remains. The Rome Treaty as a

formal expression of aims and means is a novel document of vast legal
and practical importance." (XIV).
3. See chapter IV. The Associated Overseas Countries at 76-79. For
basic documents dealing with the spreading world regional movement.
see R. C. LAWSON, INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (1962), and ROBERTSON, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE (1961), at 61-67.

4, Note in particular pages 1-37 wherein the entire movement leading to the unification of Europe is discussed.
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containing italicized headings. Hence concise statements are
not only provided as to specific areas, but a very complete
set of footnotes refers the reader to the appropriate treaty
articles. Well over half of the book consists of Appendices,
with each section or article of the particular document
indexed by section number, thereby making it possible for
the researcher quickly to locate the desired data. Unlike a
number of recent publications, the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community5 is not merely reproduced,
but rather the authors have provided a fully annotated text.
In the opinion of this reviewer, such explanation and cross
reference to other treaty articles will soon prove to be an
indispensable tool to anyone forced to conduct a speedy
investigation concerning points of law covered by the EEC
Treaty. The aid such a device can render is incalculableas the reviewer has already discovered. The remainder of
the Appendices-a total of thirteen-include numerous protocols to the treaties, declarations by various nations, and
regulations promulgated by the Community.6
It may well be asked: what significant contributions
have the authors made besides compilation?
First it is
submitted that a careful analysis has been made of the Rome
Treaty in relation to the national laws of the member
nations, and also of Great Britain, as Chapter Six entitled
Outline of Municipal Laws relates the Treaty to the member
states. Secondly, the authors are quick to detect any
change in the two successor communities, EEC and
EURATOM, over the original treaty of the ECSC.7 Finally,
the main contribution is an evaluation of the Rome Treatyand related documents-that gives "life" and "meaning" to
the various texts by the employment of a clear and direct
style."
5.

App. I,

6.

The scope of these documents

discussion;

7.

at 206.

see pages

is too extensive to permit detailed

205-465.

See, e.g., page 93 in which the new qualifications of judge serving

on the Combined Court of Justice of the three Communities are contrasted with the prior practices of the ECSC Tribunal. Such comparative data

typifies the approach used throughout the entire book.

8.
"The Treaty was signed by the Six is at once an international convention, a constitution and a code of rules. It establishes a series of institutions to work out the policy of the Treaty, and where no policy has
been decided it introduces procedures whereby a policy may be achieved.
It has a jargon of its own, speaking of 'special procedures,' 'approximation'
and 'harmonisation' [sic] and at first
sight it has a certain vagueness.
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It is felt that everyone presently involved with any phase
of the regional movement, or even the informed citizen, will
find Common Market Law the first source to be examined
when an actual controversy arises, although the book is primarily directed toward legal issues arising out of economic
and commercial problems. Indeed, the American lawyer will
profit greatly from the availability of Common Market Law.
W.

PAUL GORMLEY*

BOOK NOTES
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE
CORDIALE? By Sheldon Glueck.1 Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 181. $4.95.
This book is a compilation of a series of four lectures
given in 1962 at Tulane University under the Isaac Ray
Award of the American Psychiatric Association. The first
part of the title, Law and Psychiatry, is somewhat misleading,
as the book is limited to a treatment of the relationship of
psychiatry to criminal law, with primary emphasis on the
"test" evolved to determine whether a criminal's "mental
aberration" is sufficient to operate as a defense to criminal
responsibility; 1 and there is no discussion of the relationship
of psychiatry to civil law, which is certainly a field of its
own. However, the import of the remainder of the title
is clear, and Mr. Glueck concludes by not too optimistically
largely due to the fact that many of the rules laid down still have to be
implemented by further regulation." (p. 9).
Assistant Professor of Law, State University of South Dakota School
of Law, Vermillion, South Dakota.
T Roscoe Pound Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School:
member of the Supreme Court's Advisor Committee on Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and currently on the Committee on the Revision of the Rules:
Chairman of the Scientific Committee of the International Society of
Criminology, Paris; author or co-author with his wife, of MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925); UNRAVELING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY (1950); PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1959);
and many other books and articles in law reviews and psychological and
sociological journals.
1. Four basic tests of determining the defense of "insanity" are discussed: M'Nnghten test (right-wrong test) laid down in Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 210-211, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-723 (1943); Irresistible Impulse test laid down in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 596, 2 So.
854, 868 (1886); Durham test (product of the disease test) laid down in
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954): and MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01 (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
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stating, ". . . that there are signs that the long-lasting cold
war between the legal and psychiatric professions is coming
to a close." (p. 173).
The four lectures are entitled as follows: Dilemmas in
the Partnership of Law and Psychiatry; From M'Naghten
to Durham; Durham and Beyond; and Wider Horizons for
Law and Psychiatry. Each lecture is subdivided into numerous sections to give logical breaks in the discussion. There
are no section outlines, but there is an alphabetical index
consisting of seven pages which is sufficiently detailed to
allow quick access to any point sought.
The entire book deals with the subject of the administration of criminal justice, with emphasis on the defense of
insanity or "mental aberration." The first lecture merely
lays the foundation for the subsequent more detailed treatment of the various "insanity" tests, and discusses the
"dilemmas" in their administration. At the root of the
problem is ". . . the conflict between the goal of 'prompt and
efficient law enforcement' and the need to shield the individual against violation of his constitutional rights. ' ' 2 (p. 38).
In the second and third lectures Mr. Glueck discusses in
detail ". . . the 'tests' evolved by the law to mark off those
persons whose mental aberration is deemed to be serious
enough to justify their exemption from criminal responsibility." (p. 41). After setting forth what he considers the seven
"desiderata of a modern touchstone of irresponsibility as
related to mental disease or defects" (p. 42), the author
proceeds to analyze and criticize the prevailing tests of
"irresponsibility. '"
In his opinion these tests ". . . contain
grave faults not only from the point of view of modern
psychiatry but also from that of legal analysis of the bases
of responsibility and guilt." (p. 79). The third lecture is
devoted to a detailed discussion of the Durham case,4 with
useful comparisons made between this test and the prevailing
2. A discussion of this problem
367 U.S. 568 (1961).

3.

was noted

in

Culombe v. Connecticut.

The prevailing test is the M'Naghten test (right-wrong test), which

has been adopted in twenty-nine states according to WEIHOFEN, THE
URGE TO PUNISH 174-75 (1956), cited in note 15, page 49. Nearly all the
remaining states have adopted the irresistible impulse test, although Vermont has enacted a statute based on the A.L.I. Model Penal Code.
4. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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doctrines in the M'Naghten and Parson cases. After proposing carefully designed jury instructions regarding "irresponsibility" (pp. 105-06) based on the Durham test, the author
discusses one of the basic weaknesses in this test; namely,
the heavy burden of proof placed upon the prosecution to
to rebut, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense of "insanity" once a "scintilla" of evidence is introduced by the
defendant. (pp. 112-18). As a compromise to some of the
basic faults in the prevailing tests, and the Durham test,
Mr. Glueck suggests that a "diminished responsibility" test
be applied, which would, through a mid-verdict, provide for
treatment, supervision and correction of the mentally ill, yet
protect society and satisfy the demand for some social
expression of disapproval of the offender's behavior where,
though some illness exists, its serious involvement in the
misconduct charged is doubtful or ambiguous.5 Both the
second and third lectures have detailed documentation in the
notes, which makes the work valuable as a research tool
on the technical aspects of this problem.
In the final lecture Mr. Glueck discusses five specific
areas in which he feels there must be development before the
sentencing and treatment processes of penal administration
can be fully used for "reform" rather than "recidivism."
These areas are:
court-clinics to discover psychopathy
among those awaiting trial; 6 reform in the administration
of criminal justice with a more realistic division of labor
between judge and behavioral therapist; improvement of the
public mental hospitals and increasing the number of psychiatrists and practitioners of related arts; expanding research
programs in psychiatry and adjunctive disciplines; and
enrichment of curricula not only in preparing psychotherapeutic personnel but in extending opportunities for relevant
extralegal study to law students.

5. The mid-verdict proposal is discussed throughout the entire book
as a possible compromise-solution. See discussions at page 23, sub-section
V of lecture 3, and page 111.
6. Note especially sub-section III of lecture 4, where the author cites
the Massachusetts Briggs Law as an example of the "court-clinic." Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 123, § 100A (1959), which provides for psychiatric
examination by a neutral psychiatrist (before it is known if the defendant
will plead insanity) of persons indicted for capital offenses, those known
to have been indicted for any other offense more than once, and those
previously convicted of a felony.
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This book not only treats in detail the existing law on
the subject of "irresponsibility," but includes thought-provoking proposals as to what the law should be, such laws preferably being established by statute rather than judicial decision.
It would seem that this book itself is a big step towards
entente cordiale between the legal and psychiatric professions.
JOHN F. STONE

HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW. By Alan Latman. Washington, D. C.: BNA Incorporated, 1962. Pp. 385. $9.25.
As the title implies this book concerns itself with that
area of statutory law which has to do with the craft of the
author, composer, and artist.
Mr. Latman has addressed himself, in this revised
edition, to an examination and an evaluation of the most
recent trends in the area of copyright law. The procedure
used in this evaluation is to analyze the Copyright statute.'
Beginning with a brief history of copyright legislation
in chapter one, Mr. Latman moves into a discussion of copyrightable subject matter in chapters two through four. The
coverage of copyright suggested by the Constitution is
"writings" of "authors." (p. 12). These "writings" are
discussed within their statutory classes:
(a) books; (b)
periodicals; (c) lectures, sermons, addresses; (d) dramatic
or dramatico-musical compositions; (e) musical compositions; (f) maps; (g) works of art; and (h) reproductions of a
work of art. Non-copyrightable material is presented as
material outside the realm of copyright law.
Ownership of statutory copyright is discussed in chapter
five. Who has the right to secure a copyright?; when can
there be joint ownership?; what are the rights of a ghost
writer?; and when can a copyright be assigned?, are a few
of the questions answered by Mr. Latman in this chapter.
Chapters six through ten cover the statutory requisites
necessary to establish copyright protection. Publication is
1.

'nited

States Copyright Law, Title 17 U.S.C. (1947).
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said to be the point from which the term of protection is
computed. The imperfection or misplacement of the notice
is fatal to the copyright protection. Deposit of copies and
registration of works first published plus meeting specific
manufacturing requirements are also requisites to copyright
protection.
Even unpublished works must meet certain
requisites.
In chapter eleven we are taken through the procedures
for renewal of a copyright and the existence of renewal
rights in various beneficiaries of the author or holder of the
copyright.
Chapters twelve and thirteen enumerate the rights secured by a copyright, the infringements of these rights, and the
remedies available to protect against infringement.
Remaining chapters discuss the establishment of copyright relations with foreign countries, the tax aspects
involved in exploiting a copyright: ordinary income or capital
gain, and local State copyright legislation.
This revised edition of Howell's Copyright Law brings
to date recent trends in the copyright area. In doing so it
becomes a valuable ready reference tool and readable survey
of the law of copyright.
JAY

D.

MYSTER

